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Abstract 
 
Does the Market Matter for More Than Investment? 
A Replicated Confirmation 
 
By 
 
Yiwei Zhang, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2016 
 
Major Professor: Jason Smith 
Department: Financial Economics 
 
Does the market matter for more than investment? by Jason Smith examines how the 
multiple effects of the market (through stock prices) can affect a corporation. The main 
findings are that low stock prices precede lower costs and lower investments. The main 
innovation of this work is showing that the market can matter for more than a simple 
investment. Low stock prices imply that the market may disagree with investment and lead 
the manager to reduce costs.  This result does not appear to be driven by financial constraints. 
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1    Introduction 
The market economy is a competitive economy. Under the conditions of economic 
globalization, the competition between enterprises not only in the country, but also in the 
world. If the company wishes to win the competition, the corporate decision made by the 
manager must take the market demand and supply as its core. At the same time, this makes 
reducing production costs and improving production efficiency a goal. However, how can 
they achieve this goal? Polk and Sapienza (2008) considered whether mispricing in the stock 
market affects the company investment policy. Then they test Catering Theory and show that 
the corporate investment decisions of enterprises are greatly influenced by the market value of 
the company. So the consistency of market and investment is very significant.  This paper has 
two objectives. One is that the market can matter for more than a corporate investment; the 
other is that the disagreement between the market and the manager can affect companies and 
makes them reduce production costs and improve production efficiency. 
Why can the market affect corporate investment? The manager can get investment 
opportunities from the capital market if they have comprehensive and correct information. In 
contrast, if the manager gets wrong and incomplete information, what will happen? The 
disagreement between market and manager would cause stock mispricing. According to a 
CNN report, people pay a lot of money to the investment manager in order to get more 
benefits, but 86% of investment managers failed in 2014. Nearly 89% of those fund managers 
underperformed their benchmarks over the past five years; 82% did the same over the last 
decade. Why does this happen? Because the market disagrees with the corporate investment, 
the market and the manager will have asymmetric information.   
Why does the manager get incorrect and incomplete information? One essential reason 
is financial constraints. Due to financial constraints, the manager will only focus on the 
information about the market, and the other parts of the information are ignored. If there are 
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no financial constraints, the manager will be concerned about the changes in the market and 
make the most correct investment choices. In some instances, the manager must choose 
between reducing production costs and increasing investment due to financial constraints. If 
the market agrees with corporate investment, the manager will increase investment and create 
the new product. If the market disagrees with corporate investment, the manager will decrease 
investment and improve cost efficiency.  
How to identify an agreement? The first measure of an agreement is dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. The second measure and the third measure are according to Chen, 
Hong, and Stein (2001). The second measure is to take the number of funds that hold the 
stock at t minus the number of funds that hold the stock at t-1 and divide by the total number 
of funds in the sample at t-1. This measure is useful for forecasting returns. The third measure 
is the change in aggregate mutual fund stockholdings from the end of t-1 to the end of t. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss some of the 
relevant literature and empirical predictions. I describe the data in Section 3 and report the 
results in Section 4. I make a discussion about robustness in Section 5, and in Section 6 
summarizes my results. 
 
2    Related literature and Predictions 
Getting information from the market is a very important step before the manager 
makes a corporate investment decision. Zuo (2013) examines whether managers use 
information contained in stock prices when making forward-looking disclosures. He found 
when more deals are being informed, the association between forecast revisions and changes 
in stock prices are the most powerful during the period of revision. Then he discovered that if 
more investor information were reflected in stock prices, it would be better to promote the 
improvement of prediction accuracy. Bank and Lawrenzz (2005) considered the influence of 
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asymmetric information between managers and investors on the optimal capital structure 
decision. They concluded that the manager will try to avoid debt, and their optimal 
bankruptcy threshold is lower than the threshold set by equity holders. Boujelbenel and 
Besbes’s (2012) study of 124 firms from 1999 to 2008 reach the conclusion that the average 
daily trading volume has a positive effect on the asymmetric information between managers 
and investors, and the stock price has a negative effect on the asymmetric information 
between managers and investors.  
A lot of literature explained the effect on the disagreement between the market and 
corporate investment. Thakor and Whited (2006) shows, “we found first that a high stock 
price and a low level of disagreement act together to increase investment today relative to 
invest tomorrow.” In their model, the disagreement and firm value is inversely related. 
Compared to asymmetric information or managerial entrenchment, disagreement can drive 
corporate investment. Baker, Hollifield, and Osambela (2016) argue that disagreement can 
increase stock return volatility, and lead to a countercyclical price of risk and procyclical 
investment growth. 
Bakke and Whited (2010) use an econometric errors-in-variables remedy to test that 
stock market mispricing does not affect corporate investment. However, most literature 
disagrees with this viewpoint. Farhi and Panageas (2004) considered the effect that stock 
market mispricing has two aspects. One aspect is that it will make the manager make wrong 
investment decision and cause production inefficiencies. The other aspect is that it will make 
the problem of insufficient funds to be eased, so that some projects will be effectively carried 
out.  
  Khanal, Koirala, Regmi (2016) provides an improved understanding of the role of 
financial and economic factors in rice production efficiency. Then we use a parametric 
stochastic frontier model and a non-parametric DEA (data envelopment analysis) approach to 
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find that financial constraint has a negative impact on efficiency, while a combined effect of 
education and off-farm work have a positive impact on efficiency. Chan (2008) considers that 
the financial constraints do not limit the company’s output reaction to negative shocks, but it 
restricts the positive shocks. She draws the conclusion that financial constraints can be used to 
prevent the company from using production opportunities to make a profit.  
I conclude some testable implications from these discussions. First, the disagreement 
will cause lower corporate investment and lower production cost. Second, asymmetric 
information will lead to stock market mispricing and stock market mispricing is associated 
with financial constraint. Robustness tests support the results for the least financially 
constrained firms.  
 
3    Data 
Sample data of all firms are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
and COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual Database from January 1970 through December 2003. I 
obtained the analysts’ forecast data from I/B/E/S Database for all firms from January 1980 
through December 2003. The full sample includes 127,582 observations. The Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) includes daily stock prices for all firms from January 
1980 to December 2003. Thompson Financial Network (TFN) includes quarterly mutual 
funds data for all mutual funds from January 1980 to December 2003.   
Cash flow can be calculated by subtracting the change in working capital (Compustat 
data cwkcap) from operating income before depreciation (Compustat data oibd). Costs can be 
calculated by adding selling, general, administrative expenses (Compustat data sgaex) and the 
cost of goods sold (Compustat data cgs). Investment is defined as capital expenditures 
(Compustat data capex). I calculated net equity issuance by subtracting the change in retained 
earnings over lagged book assets (Compustat data cretearn) from the change in book equity 
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(Compustat data cbequity). Debt issuance can be calculated by long-term debt reduction 
(Compustat data debt_reduction) from long-term debt issuance (Compustat data debt_issue) 
less. Appendix A includes the rest of variables descriptions. We report summary statistics for 
the variables in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
3.1    Agreement Measures 
In this paper, how to measure the agreement between the management and investors is 
most important. I provide three proxies to calculate the amount of agreements between the 
management and investors.  The first proxy for agreement is dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, denoted SDAF. Forecast dispersion is widely used to proxy for the measure of 
agreement. I measured forecast dispersion as the standard deviation of analyst forecast 
earnings usually based on the absolute value of the mean earnings forecast.  
The second proxy is the breadth of mutual fund holdings, denoted Breadtht, according 
to the Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), as defined by the ratio of the number of mutual funds 
holding a long position in the stock in quarter t to the total number of mutual funds in quarter t. 
ΔBreadtht is defined as the number of mutual funds at quarter t minus the number of mutual 
funds at quarter t-1 divided by the total number of mutual funds at quarter t-1. 
The third proxy is the total mutual fund holdings, denoted Heldt, and is defined as the 
total number of mutual fund holdings at the end of quarter t divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding. ΔHeldt is defined as the change in mutual fund holdings from the end of 
quarter t-1 to the end of quarter t.  
In table 2, I show the correlation between SDAFt-1, ΔBreadtht, and ΔHeldt. The 
correlation coefficient between the SDAFt-1 and ΔBreadtht is near 8%, the correlation 
 7 
coefficient between SDAFt-1 and ΔHeldt is less than 1%, and the correlation coefficient 
between ΔBreadtht and ΔHeldt is greater than 10%. 
 
3.2    Financial Constraints 
Controlling for debt issuance, equity issuance, and financial constraints can make 
markets agree with the corporate investment decision, even if the firm is short of funding. 
Debt issuance and equity issuance have been explained above. How to control financial 
constraints? There are many ways to control the financial constraints, and now we focus on 
one of them. Payout Ratio.  
The payout ratio is calculated as dividends per share over earnings per share. 
According to Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), payout ratio can be used as a proxy for 
financial constraints. If the firm is short of external funding, the firm will choose not to pay 
dividends or pay fewer dividends, leading to a lower payout ratio, which will be more likely 
to have financial constraints. However, from the perspective of long-term growth in the future, 
even the firm has a positive profit. The firm will also choose not to pay dividends or pay 
fewer dividends to increase the internal funds. Finally, the firm has a lower payout ratio and 
more financial constraints. 
 
4    Empirical Results 
4.1     Production Efficiency 
This cost regression is used to measure of each agreement: 
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝑓𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) + 𝛽2 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) + 𝛽4(𝐴. 𝑆. 𝐺. ) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
From Table 3, I use cost and alternative cost to analyze three agreement measures. 
[Insert Table 3] 
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The coefficient of the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast is -0.058. Dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts is the inverse of agreement, so the increase of dispersion will 
cause the decrease in agreement. If dispersion increases one standard deviation, the costs will 
decrease 1.91%. The coefficient of the change in the breadth of mutual fund holding is 2.04. 
If the breadth of mutual fund holdings increases one standard deviation, the costs will increase 
1.632%. The change in percent of total mutual fund holding has positive coefficient is 0.299. 
If the change in percent of total mutual fund holding increase one standard deviation, the costs 
will increase of 1.465%. The result of the alternative costs measure is close to the costs 
measure. All of the variables are significant at the one percent level. 
 
4.2    Financial Constraints 
If the firm has financial constraints, the firm will have some limits in the market. But 
when the firm does not have financial constraints, the firm is free to make a decision. In order 
to prove this point, I created a financial constraint group and a financial unconstraint group to 
run the test for firms. If the result for unconstrained firms does not change, it provides 
evidence to prove that the market is not the only factor that affects the corporation. Table 4 
presents the results using payout ratio to measure financial constraint. 
[Insert Table 4] 
From Table 4, it gives evidence that the firm has more financial constraints; the 
economic impact of the agreement will be greater. Even for a financially unconstrained firm, 
the agreement between the market and corporate investment also influence the firm’s cost 
structure.  Most of the variables are significant at the one percent level. 
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5    Robustness 
If the market has more investment opportunity, the firm will choose the investment. 
However, when the market has less investment opportunity, the manager has to choose to cut 
the production costs. Through a robustness check for the investment opportunity, a dummy 
variable consists of each four-digit industry code. The result does not include the firm’s fixed 
effects because many firms’ primary industry does not change in the sample. All results are 
unaffected. 
 
6    Conclusion 
The main topic of this paper is to discuss the disagreement and agreement between the 
market and corporate investment. This paper has sufficient evidence to prove that 
disagreement between the market and corporate investment can let companies reduce 
production costs and improve production efficiency. If the market agrees with the corporate 
investment, the manager will take time to consider investment while not considering costs. 
If the firm is lacks of external funding, the manager will also choose costs reduction. 
Controlling for debt issuance, equity issuance, and financial constraints can make the market 
agree with the corporate investment decision, even if the firm is short of funding. One thing 
that is worth mentioning is that using the payout ratio to measure financial constraints. 
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  Table 1  
Summary Statistics  
The table reports the means, medians, standard deviations, minimums, and maximums for all 
variables in the sample. Note that all variables reported here are taken from the largest sample 
available. Appendix A is variable definitions. 
Variables Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
SDAFt-1   0.136 0.038 0 .331 0.000 2.418 
ΔBreadtht-1 0. .001 0.000 0. .008 -0.024     0 .033 
ΔHeldt-1 0 .007 0.003 0 .049 -0.140 0.0166 
Sizet 5.034 4.714 1.844 2.302 13.381 
Ct 1.323 1.144 0 .950 0 .077 5.472 
Alt. Ct 1.269 1.083 0 .947 0 .077 5.337 
Salest 1.169 1.100 0 .421 0 .398 3.672 
NEIt 0 .057 0.002 0 .198 -0.149 1.338 
NDIt 0.025 0.000 0 .125 -0.247 0.702 
A.S.G. 0 .149 0.105 0 .243 -0.566      2.598 
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
The table presents the correlation between the three measures of agreement. 
 SDAFt-1 ΔBreadtht ΔHeldt 
SDAFt-1 1.000   
ΔBreadtht -0.078 1.000  
ΔHeldt 0.000 0.161 1.000 
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Table 3 
Estimation Results : Costs 
The table reports the results from regressing the four measures of agreement on costs and alternate 
costs. P-values are report in parenthesis 
Variables  Cost   Alternative Costs 
         I        II        III       IV       V       VI 
SDAFt-1                                 -0.058
*** 
(0.000) 
 
  -0.054
*** 
(0.000) 
  
ΔBreadtht-1  2.040
*** 
(0.000) 
 
  1.832
*** 
(0.000) 
 
ΔHeldt-1   0.299
*** 
(0.000) 
 
  0.256
*** 
(0.000)
 
A.S.G. 0.173
*** 
(0.000) 
0.226
*** 
(0.000) 
0.197
*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.169
*** 
(0.000) 
0.217
*** 
(0.000) 
0.190
*** 
(0.000) 
Sizet     -0.141
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.136
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.134
*** 
(0.000) 
 
-0.131
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.126
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.124
*** 
(0.000) 
Salest   0.402
*** 
(0.000) 
0.367
*** 
(0.000) 
0.197
*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.374
*** 
(0.000) 
0.335
*** 
(0.000) 
0.341
*** 
(0.000)
 
Intercept 
 
 
1.613
*** 
(0.000) 
 
1.572
*** 
(0.000) 
1.546
*** 
(0.000) 
 
1.525
*** 
(0.000) 
1.493
*** 
(0.000) 
1.468
*** 
(0.000) 
N 32451 36077 38598 32451 36077 38598 
Adj. R-squared 0.274 0.221 0.217 0.2645 0.214 0.210 
    Significance levels :       *** : 1%       ** : 5%       * : 10% 
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Table 4 
Estimation Results : Financial Constraint – Cost 
The table reports the costs regression results for both financially constrained and 
financially unconstrained firms determined by the payout ratio. P-value are report in 
parenthesis. 
Financial   Payout   Ratio   
Criteria (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U) 
SDAFt-1   -0.032
**
 
(0.016) 
 
-0.050
 *** 
(0.000) 
    
ΔBreadtht-1   2.384
***
 
(0.000) 
 
0.727*** 
(0.001) 
  
ΔHeldt-1     0.215
*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.128
** 
(0.013) 
A.S.G. 0.099
** 
(0.028) 
0.217
*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.138
*** 
(0.000) 
0.222
*** 
(0.000) 
0.138
*** 
(0.000) 
0.217
*** 
(0.000) 
Sizet -0.159
** 
(0.000) 
-0.165
*** 
(0.000) 
 
-0.138
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.152
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.136
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.154
*** 
(0.000) 
Salest 0.300
*** 
(0.000) 
0.278
*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.279
*** 
(0.000) 
0.251
*** 
(0.000) 
0.272
*** 
(0.000) 
0.261
*** 
(0.000) 
Intercept 1.711
*** 
(0.000) 
1.878
*** 
(0.000) 
 
1.599
*** 
(0.000) 
1.726
*** 
(0.000) 
1.579
*** 
(0.000) 
1.728
*** 
(0.000) 
N 6717 14315 11216 17218 10420 16998 
Adj. R-squared 0.329 0.320 0.276 0.257 0.273 0.265 
    Significance levels :       *** : 1%       ** : 5%       * : 10% 
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Appendix A 
 SDAFt-1 = standard deviation of analyst forecast over the absolute value of the mean 
forecast; 
 ∆Breadtht = Change in the number of funds holding a particular stock from t-1 to t 
only if the fund is in the sample in both t-1 and t; 
 ∆Heldt = Change in the percent of total outstanding shares held by funds from 
𝑡 − 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡; 
 Sizet = ln(book assets); 
 Ct = 
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 =  SG & A plus cost of goods sold over lagged assets; 
 Alt. Ct = Ct less research and development expense less advertising expense; 
 Salest = 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 =  sales over lagged assets; 
  NEIt = Change in book equity less change in retained earnings over lagged book 
assets; 
  NDIt = Debt issued less debt reduction; 
 A.S.G = Three year average sales growth; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
